Some presupposition triggers, like too, seem to be obligatory in discourses where the presupposition they induce is explicitely expressed. We show that this phenomenon concerns a larger class than is usually acknowledged, and suggest that this class corresponds to the class of presupposition triggers that have no asserted content. We then propose a pragmatic explanation relying on the neo-gricean notion of antipresupposition. We also show that the phenomenon has a complex interaction with discourse relations.
Introduction
The starting point of this work is a number of situations where some presupposition triggers seem obligatory in discourse. Here are two examples.
In (1a-b), the presupposition trigger ne... plus (not anymore) is clearly preferred over the simple negation ne... pas (not). 1 However, both have the same asserted content, and the presuppositional content conveyed by ne... plus does not add anything in this particular context, because (1a) is a clear instance of presupposition binding (van der Sandt 1992; Kamp 2001) : what ne... plus could add with respect to ne... pas (i.e. John went to Canada) is part of the common ground since it was already asserted in the first clause. In other words, we are here in a situation where the speaker seems to be "forced to presuppose", forced to use a presupposition trigger, even if this trigger doesn't bring any new information in the context.
To put it differently, we could say that in such cases, a form of informational redundancy seems obligatory, which is unexpected, redundancy being usually banned when, say, the same content is asserted twice, or even when already presupposed material is asserted. Here the redundancy has to be achieved by means of a presupposition trigger.
Our aim in this paper is first to show that the phenomenon, which has already been described in the literature for several particles, is more general than is usually acknowledged (Section 2), then to propose a pragmatic explanation for it (Section 3), and finally to take into account the interaction of the phenomenon with discourse in general (Section 4).
Data
We first survey in this section previous accounts of similar obligatoriness ( § 2.1), before trying to define the relevant class of presupposition triggers ( § 2.3), after having said a few more words on the importance of presupposition ( § 2.2).
1. It turns out that in French, pas and plus are really interchangeable and cannot occur together in such contexts. So we have a strong suggestion that they form an alternative, that the speaker has to choose between the two, whereas in English, for instance, the choice would be between adding anymore or not. But we believe that what we are dealing in this paper does not depend on this idiosyncratic property of French.
(2) a. Jo had fish and Mo did too b. *Jo had fish and Mo did (Kaplan 1984, p. 510) The simplest cases may suggest that we deal with syntactic constraints. However, semantics clearly plays a role, as can be seen with the next pair of examples. Here, too is not strictly obligatory, and the sentence (3b) is syntactically and semantically well-formed. However, it is pragmatically deviant, since it is suggesting that beeing seventeen is not beeing old enough to have a driver's licence.
(3) a. Barb is seventeen, and Wendy is old enough to have a driver's license, too b. #Barb is seventeen, and Wendy is old enough to have a driver's license (Green 1968) Kaplan's proposal, in a nutshell, derives the obligatoriness of too from its discourse function, which is to "emphasize the similarity between members of a pair of contrasting items' ' (p. 516) . This proposal relies crucially on the presence of a contrast, and applies only to examples like (2) where a conjunction (with and or but) is involved.
Krifka
In a paper about stressed additive particles, (Krifka 1999) makes several comments about the obligatoriness of too. It should be noted that his paper is concerned mainly with German particles, in the particular case where they occur after their focus, as in (4).
(4) Peter invited Pia for dinner, to \ o
In such configurations, according to Krifka, the additive particle is always stressed (bearing a focus stress, noted with a grave accent), and it associates with a contrastive topic, itself stressed with a topic accent, noted with an acute accent. His analysis of the reason why too is obligatory in such cases relies crucially on two facts:
1. the distinction between two types of accent, the focus accent, and the contrastive topic accent (following Büring's work (Büring 1998 ) and the classical distinction from (Jackendoff 1972 ) between A and B accents in English) 2. the existence of an implicature, derived from a distinctiveness constraint Let us recall that the placement of the focus accent is determined by the so-called discourse coherence constraint, which stipulates that the focus accent falls on the constituent which provides a congruent answer to the question (direct and exhaustive) as in (5). (5) The reasoning goes as follows. The first member of the answer 'Pe / ter ate pa \ sta' is a partial answer to the question and therefore bears a topic accent. This triggers the implicature, through application of the distinctiveness constraint, that there is no alternative α to Peter such that the speaker is willing to assert 'α ate pasta' . So, by the epistemic step usual in such reasoning, it follows that no one else but Peter ate pasta. The speaker cannot then resume his discourse with 'Pia ate pasta' without plainly contradicting himself. Krifka's proposal is that the semantics of too is such that it allows the violation of distinctiveness by explicitly stating a discourse relation. According to Krifka, too is stressed in such contexts, because it brings a strong assertion. As a side remark, Krifka notes that another way to answer the question in (8) would be to use a conjunction as in (9). In such a case, there is no contrastive topic accent, and the speaker conforms to the maxim of manner, by preferring (9b) over (8b). We note that Krikfa's reasoning relies crucially on the presence of a topic accent in the first part of the answer, and on the idea that this very accent triggers a distinctiveness implicature, which then has to be canceled via the use of the additive particle. The presuppositional nature of too (and of other additive particles) doesn't play any role.
Saebϕ
The recent paper (Saebϕ 2004 ) is directly concerned with the obligatoriness of too, and it brings several objections to Krifka's proposal. First, it is noted that there are contexts in which too is obligatory, even though there is no contrastive topic. It is the case, in particular, in narrative discourses like in (10).
(10) When the gods arrive at Jotunheim, the giants prepare the wedding feast. But during the feast, the bride -Thor, that is-devours an entire ox and eight salmon. He also drinks three barrels of beer. This astonishes Thrym. But Loki averts the danger by explaining that Freyja has been looking forward to coming to Jotunheim so much that she has not eaten for a week. When Thrym lifts the bridal veil to kiss the bride, he is startled to find himself looking into Thor's burning eyes. This time, ( # 0/too ), Loki saves the situation, explaining that the bride has not slept for a week for longing for Jotunheim.
Saebϕ also shows that even if one wants to take advantage of the presence of contrastive topics and the idea that they trigger a distinctiveness implicature, the computation should not be done from the first sentence, but from the second one. Thus, for instance, Krifka's reasoning does not explain why too is compulsory in an example like (11). In this example, the speaker establishes a contrast between north and south. So, Saebϕ claims that to account for the obligatoriness of too, it is not necessary to bring in to play the presence of a contrast in the context, nor to appeal to a distinctiveness implicature. Rather, it is sufficient to analyze the proper meaning of too: adding the particle would introduce information meant to cancel an implicature that would otherwise be triggered by the sentence without too, and which is in contradiction with the context. We won't present here the details of Saebϕ's analysis, but we retain two elements from it: first, the idea that the presuppositional character of -too is more important than the fact that it associates with a contrastive topic; second, the idea that the reasoning takes as a starting point the implicatures -and presuppositions triggered by the second sentence rather than by the first one.
Our proposal, relying on an implicature triggered, not by the presence of an accent in the first sentence, but by the possibility of use of too in the second one, is more in line with Saebϕ's work than with Krifka's, and accounts for examples like (10) and (11).
Intermediate conclusion
What we take from the accounts very briefly summarized here is firstly that a proper account of the phenomenon has to take into account the fact that it is not limited to the well-known case of too ; a much larger class of particles (or presupposition triggers) exhibits the same behavior. Secondly, we also consider, after Saebϕ, that even though contrast seems indeed to play a role, the presuppositional aspect (which has to do with discourse linking) should be investigated further. This is why we try in the following sections to characterize as precisely as possible the class of items proving obligatory in the kind of contexts we have seen. But before doing so, we want to show why we consider that presupposition plays a bigger role than usually acknowledged.
The role of presupposition

Discourse particles
Zeevat's work (Zeevat 2002; Zeevat 2003 ) is also concerned with the class of obligatory items, proposing (among many other things) that the obligatoriness of too (and various other phenomena) be accounted for by considering a larger class of discourse particles, presupposition no longer playing a crucial role in the explanation. The argument relies in part on the observation that there is a set of particles that have in common (1) that they are obligatory (or, rather, not optional), (2) that they have a "minimal meaning", and (3) that they give rise to an accessibility anomaly. This class would contain too, but also particles like indeed.
It turns out that the class of triggers we want to consider have indeed the first two properties (see Section 2.3). As for accessibility, a few more words are necessary.
Accessibility differences
Zeevat proposes a list of obligatory triggers (Zeevat 2002, p. 85) which might serve as a starting point, but his list does not contain several presupposition triggers we want to consider, and contains particles which are not presuppositional and that we do not want to consider here. Let us start with these.
A good example is indeed (Zeevat 2003) . We do not consider such a particle as triggering a presupposition, and we claim that there are two reasons why it should be kept separated from the triggers we consider.
Firstly, what Zeevat calls accessibility constraints do not apply identically for indeed and for too:
(12) a. *Mary dreamt that night that she would fail the exam and John will fail too b. Mary dreamt that night that she would fail the exam and indeed she did
Here it is expected that too is not licensed because the antecedent is not accessible. Indeed, on the contrary, as a discourse particle, seems able to access the very same "antecedent'' . Secondly, on the contrary, too, as a presupposition trigger, is not sensitive to embeddings that are presupposition holes, as in (13a-b). 2 As a consequence, too is obligatory even inside an embedding, as soon as its presupposition is satisfied. Compare with (13c). These examples seem to us harder to account for if it is considered that too (for example) is a discourse connective, since we expect discourse connectives to work differently when they are embedded (roughly, discourse connectives are sensitive to embedding, whereas presupposition triggers are not-leaving aside the well-known projection problem cases).
Generalization
Even though it may be the case that the phenomenon we are dealing with here is not limited to presupposition triggers, we still think that it is worth trying to define 2. It turns out that the embedding under negation of many of the triggers involved here cannot be done easily because they are polarity items (negative for plus, positive for aussi, encore).
precisely the sub-class of presupposition triggers that are obligatory, and that is what we try to do in this section. So, in a way, cleft constructions are not obligatory. But here what permits us to dispense of the cleft construction is the presence of another trigger: intonation, in such contexts, is usually considered to trigger a presupposition (in English at least) (Beaver 2001, p. 11, e.g.) . Besides, the presupposition triggered by 'john VP-ed' and by 'It is John who VP-ed' is the same. We conclude that what is compulsory is the use of one of the available triggers, which is confirmed by (17) where in the absence of any presupposition trigger, the discourse becomes deviant.
Inventory
(17) #Someone fixed the dinner. John did it.
In French, it is not so clear that intonation behaves as a presupposition trigger, because of general properties of the French intonation system. For instance, in (18), there does not seem to be a way of stressing Jean that could render the example acceptable.
(18) a. Quelqu'un a préparé le dîner. Ce n' est pas Jean qui l'a fait/# Jean ne l'a pas fait.
Someone fixed the dinner. It is not Jean who did it/Jean did not do it
In other cases, the behavior of French is closer to that of English: So, we have to add to our inventory both cleft constructions and presuppositional intonation, which share the same presuppositional content, and which are such that when their presupposition is satisfied, it is obligatory to use one of them (so, in a way, obligatoriness is not attached to a specific lexical item or contruction, but rather to the set of available means to express one given presupposition). Despite the large number of different triggers involved, it is clear however that all are not obligatory.
Consider for instance the trigger regret. For the sake of the argument, we can assume that (20a) presupposes (20b) and asserts (20c). If this trigger behaved similarly to the ones we have considered so far, then (20d) would be out, the only option being (20e). But both options are available. Similarly, the restriction trigger only can be analyzed as presupposing its prejacent (21b) and asserting the exclusion (21c). Then again, it is possible to form a discourse with both pieces of information without being forced to use the trigger (21d), while the version with the trigger is also possible (21e). So we can't find situations where a trigger like regret, or only, is obligatory, and this is not really a surprise, because such triggers can't be added or removed without altering the asserted content of the host sentence.
Definition of the class
Let us try now to find a characteristic property of the triggers that give rise to this obligatoriness phenomenon. We take additivity, as Krifka defines it, as a starting point. An additive particle (add) is a particle such that when added to a proposition in which a constituent F is focused, it yields an interpretation that can be divided into two parts, an asserted content which is exactly the initial proposition (without add), and a presupposed content stating that there is an alternative F′ such that replacing F with F′ in the initial proposition gives a true proposition. 3 It is quite easy to check that aussi, non plus (negative polarity version of aussi) fit with this definition (F′ can be an individual, or a property, depending on what is focused).
When it comes to other triggers usually considered as additive, like encore, de nouveau, toujours, the above definition has to be slightly amended. For instance, with encore (still), assuming an underlying event (à la (Davidson 1967) ), or a state, or a time interval, the presupposed part would rather be something like ∃F′ < F [...F′ ...], saying that there is another eventuality not only different from F but also temporally located before F in the past.
The previous definition assumes that we can easily separate the additive particle and the rest of the sentence (noted [...
F ...]).
When it comes to ne... plus in French, things become slightly more complicated, since simply removing plus would lead to an ungrammatical sentence (at least in modern French), and we have to admit that (23a) can be analyzed as being composed of a sentential negation (historically brought by ne) and an additive adverb ( plus (more)). This seems reasonable, when considering other languages where the equivalent of ne... plus is a compound with a negation and an additive particle (no more, nichtmehr, nonpiu...) . (23) 
For to know whether/if, it is intuitively easy to separate the asserted part from the presupposed part, but again, it is not possible to have it fit with Krifka's definition. 4 To have it fit, we have to stipulate that to know that is a compound form : to know whether + factivity. So it is not possible to gather all the triggers here in the class of additive triggers, but they still have a common property, which can be stated as follows: their asserted content is reduced to their clausal scope (Krifka 1999) , i.e. the clause to which they are added. As for their presupposed content, it is much more complex than in the definition (22) 
Cleft and intonation Presupposition: the proposition is true or one member of an alternative set (not necessarily different from F).
Some factive verbs savoir + que/si, ignorer + que/si, vérifier +que/si, realize, be aware. Presupposition: the embedded proposition is true (factivity).
To sum up, this property defines a sub-class of presupposition triggers (not estricted to particles, neither to additive triggers) which are bligatory as soon as their conditions of use (presupposition) are (linguistically) satisfied.
Pragmatic explanation
We are looking for a general explanation, not relying on the semantics of a particular presupposition trigger, since the phenomenon involves an apparently heterogeneous class of triggers.
One common point in all our examples is that they somehow involve redundancy. Presupposition is a well-known tool for expressing redundancy (Roberts 1998 , e.g.); we can thus characterize our examples as cases where redundancy is obligatory. This is reminiscent of a classical test for presupposition, namely the fact that a proposition cannot be asserted after it has been presupposed, whereas the contrary (first an assertion, then a presupposition) is possible: see (27) (van der Sandt 1988, p. 161).
(27) a. Mary used to beat her husband. She has now stopped doing so.
b. #Mary has now stopped beating her husband. She used to beat him.
The usual explanation for this contrast has a pragmatic flavor: roughly, the speech act associated with assertion (bringing new information) cannot be felicitously performed in a context where this information is already in the common ground. In contrast, the speech act associated with a presupposition is compatible (by definition) with a context where the presupposition is in the common ground. This pragmatic flavor motivates the explanation we are elaborating in this section ; but it is worth noting that the phenomenon also interacts with discourse structure, which is dealt with in Section 4.
To explain the data, we can compare it with those studied in (Heim 1991) (we use Sauerland's (Sauerland 2003 ) presentation). Let us consider (28). Heim's proposal is to get inspiration from Hawkins' proposal: just like the classical scalar alternative set in (29a), which gives rise to the famous gricean quantity based implicature, the pair ·a, theÒ forms a scalar alternative pair, when taking presupposition into account.
(29) "Scalar alternatives" a. ·some, allÒ assertion b. ·a, theÒ presupposition (Hawkins 1978) More precisely, the bears more presuppositions (uniqueness presupposition) than a. Then the use of a implicates that the presuppositions of the other term of the scale are not satisfied (namely, that it is not true that John has only one wife, for the example (28a)), which is incompatible with world knowledge. This behavior is supposed to derive from a general principle labeled "maximize presupposition" in (Sauerland 2003) : make your contribution presuppose as much as possible (see also (Percus 2006; Schlenker 2008) ). We use a similar method to explain our data, with the difference that the phenomenon at hand occurs in discourse and not in isolation. Let us consider the example given in (14a) (repeated in (30a)), where aussi is obligatory.
We start with the familiar scalar implicature computation. First, there is an (asymmetric) entailment relation given in (30b). 5 For expository reasons, we write this down as in (30c), where A stands for assertion, and P for presupposition.
. This is true if, in a Russelian treatment of presupposition, we conjoin the assertive part and the presupposed part, as noted in (30c). This notation may be controversial, but we use it here for simplicity reasons and we believe that nothing important hinges on it.
We can then consider the two propositions in (30b) as forming a scalar alternative. 6 Then by a classical computation we get that by uttering A the speaker implicates that (A Ÿ P) is not appropriate (30d). An additional step is required: uttering A and implicating ¬(A Ÿ P) leads to the conclusion that the presupposition does not hold (30e). Now this implicature is in turn incompatible with the first part of the discourse (30a), namely, John is sick. So, it appears that the contrasts above can all be predicted if sentences with and without presupposition triggers are considered as scalar alternatives. More precisely, we would have the following scales, with cases where the alternative is between the form with or without the trigger, and other cases where the alternative is really between two interchangeable items.
(31) a. ·pas (not), plus (no more)Ò b. ·0, aussi (too)Ò c. ·si (whether), que (that)Ò Let us come back to the comparison between our line of explanation and the one proposed in (Krifka 1999) . Let us start with Krifka's computation. The sentence John is sick (let us assume we have the appropriate context in terms of topic/focus) will give rise to the distinctiveness implicature : 'no one else is sick' . Then uttering Mary is sick would result in a plain contradiction (leaving aside the fact that this second sentence would normally in turn give rise to a distinctiveness implicature). Then too has to be added, as a sort of reparation resort: it indicates that for some reason, the speaker doesn't want the distinctiveness implicature to go through.
Our proposal makes different assumptions. After the first sentence is uttered, the question of whether or not to add too arises (since it might form an alternative with not adding anything), but its presupposition is not satisfied, and so there is no real alternative, too is not added. Then the second sentence is uttered, and the alternative is once more considered. In this case, the presupposition of too is . Leaving aside the traditional problem of deciding why the two propositions are "natural" competitors.
satisfied in the context, so that the speaker really has a choice between adding the particle or not.
If the speaker chooses not to add too, then by the scalar reasoning given above, it would lead the hearer to infer that the speaker is reluctant to add too, thus that the presupposition is not satisfied, that is nobody else is sick, and this is contradictory with the context. Therefore, to prevent the hearer from making a contradictory implicature, the speaker is obliged to use too.
Our proposal accounts for several cases presented above, which are problematic for Krifka's account. Namely, the example in (3), where there is no identity between the first element (Bart is 17) and the second one (Wendy is old enough to have a driver's licence). Saebϕ's examples are also accounted for. We can add the following very nice example, where too is not obligatory, but depending on its presence, two different readings are possible, and this is predicted by our account. There remains several questions to be answered. First, one may ask where the "maximize presupposition" principle come from. It seems however reasonable to assume that it comes from Grice's (Grice 1975 ) maxim of quantity. The second question is harder to answer: how can we predict that the couple (s, s + too) forms a (scalar) alternative? In other words, why is plus a natural competitor of pas (to take a case where it is relatively easy in French, since the two words are strictly interchangeable)? We do not have a final answer to this question, but we think a lead worth considering is precisely the fact that all the triggers involved here have no asserted contribution. See (Zeevat 2002) . Finally, a question that deserves more development is the connection with accommodation of the presupposition. It is well known that, to put it in the words of van der Sandt and Geurts's (van der Sandt & Geurts 2001), "the presupposition of too is reluctant to accommodate" (see also (Zeevat 2003) ). This property is not shared by all the triggers in our class (for instance, again seems to be quite capable of giving rise to accommodation) ; but it might help distinguish among the triggers we have grouped together, to get a better understanding of what makes them fit together. It is quite interesting to remark that, roughly, too can only be used when the presupposition is there (Zeevat 2003, p. 169) , and it has to be used when the presupposition is there.
We turn now to discourse considerations, and set out in the next section how our proposal can be implemented within a Discourse Coherence perspective.
Interaction with discourse structure
It turns out that the obligatoriness of presupposition can be removed in some contexts, and we first try to describe precisely the relevant contexts in § 4.1, before trying to implement an analysis in the framework of SDRT ( § 4.2).
Discourse sensitivity
There are a number of apparent counter-examples that we have to deal with: (33) One could draw from this data the conclusion that the availability of a discourse relation somehow blocks the requirement of the principle advocated for above. But this is not the case: in the following examples, a discourse relation is explicitly stated (by the connective c' est pourquoi), without preventing the presupposition trigger from being obligatory. This is predicted by our principle: applied recursively, the principle compares the presupposed contents to tell whether we have an alternative. Once a trigger is inserted, the other alternative forms have exactly the same presupposed content, and thus they are not required, but they are not banned either, for it is expected that a presupposition trigger with no asserted content is licit as soon as its presupposition is satisfied. So, what we'll try to implement now is a general principle which can be stated as in (37).
(37) A trigger (with no asserted content) is compulsory only if it brings strictly more satisfied presuppositions than the sentence without the trigger Let us take the discourse relation enumeration as a starting point (38). Roughly, our hypothesis is that enumeration forces the second sentence Mary is sick to be linked to the context, in a way similar (if not identical) to what too would do. So, the trigger too does not bring strictly more presuppositions, and is therefore not required any more.
(38) John is sick + contour "Enumeration" ∃x(x = j Ÿ sick(x)) "cataphoric presupposition"
It is then possible to sketch an update rule which takes into account all that we've said earlier.
(39) -When trying to attach a DRS K β to a context K τ : -Let s be the sentence corresponding to K β ; let {a 1 , a 2 , … a k } be the set of presupposition triggers without asserted content that can be adjoined to s. -For each pair (0, a i ), compare the number of satisfied presuppositions of the two members: to this effect, try to link/accommodate psp(a i ) against the context K τ via the usual procedure (Asher & Lascarides 1998 ). -If -psp(a i ) is satisfied -there is a difference in the pair ·0, a i Ò in the number of presuppositions Then the choice of 0 gives rise to the implicature that the presupposition is false (antipresupposition à la (Percus 2006) ).
The predictions that we get are the following : in most cases, the sentence s has fewer presuppositions than s + a i , so the principle applies. But what this rule predicts is that when, for any reason, the sentence s in itself already triggers a presupposition, then the principle no longer applies. This explains why it is not obligatory to use several triggers when they are available. This also explains what happens in enumeration cases : we consider that enumeration forces this forward link (be it presuppositional or not), so that the second sentence in the enumeration has to be linked to the context. Then there is no difference in the form with or without too.
As for example (b), we can consider it a special case of enumeration, but we can also see it as a contrast, and then we have to provide the semantic definition of contrast with this forward link.
. Conclusion
Starting from the obligatoriness of some presupposition triggers in discourse (when their presuppositions are satisfied in the context), we have shown that this phenomenon is not limited to additive particles, as has been previously assumed. We claim that obligatori-ness defines a sub-class of presupposition triggers, characterized by the fact that they have no asserted content. The general explanation we provide then relies on a general pragmatic principle, which could be summarized as "maximize redundancy via presupposition binding". Finally, we have also tried to provide a general explanation to account for the fact that the obligatoriness of presupposition triggers seems to be sensitive to discourse relations.
